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INTEGRATION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE A & P
COMPANY*
JOEL B. DIRLAM-2 and ALFRED E. KAHNt
Until quite recently economists who were especially concerned with
antitrust problems tended to view with suspicion the arguments advanced
to defend big, integrated businesses. To recall the outstanding instance,
they felt that the majority of the Supreme Court was guilty of superficial
reasoning in stressing the economies derived from the consolidation of
independent firms, both complementary and competing, into the U. S.
Steel Corporation.' This hostility toward size and integration continues
to find expression in some quarters. 2 Nevertheless, since World War II
there has been a strong countermovement toward criticism of antitrust
authorities for bringing suits against large, integrated firms.3 Much of
the controversy over integration and antitrust policy has centered about
the A & P case,4 including both the criminal action and the remedies now
* This article is part of a broader study of the vertical relationships between large
and small businesses under the antitrust laws conducted by the writers under the auspices
of the Cornell University Social Science Research Center. See Dirlam and Kahn,
Price Discrimination in Law and Economics, 11 Am. J. Ecox. & SoCloL. 281 (1952) ;
Leadership and Conflict in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L. J. 818 (1952) ; Antitrust
Law and the Big Buyer: Another Look at the A & P Case, 60 J. POL. EcoN. 118 (1952);
Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HAv. L. REv. 28 (1953).
t Lecturer in Economics, Connecticut College.
t Associate Professor of Economics, Cornell University.
1. See the statements of Professors FETTER AND WATKINS, RELATIVE EFFICIENCY
oF LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZED, AND SMALL BUSINESS 98-100, 107-110 (TNEC Monograph
No. 13, 1940). See also DEwING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 699-785 (3d ed.
1934); MUND, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS 159 (1950).
2. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE (1950), passin;
Adams, Is Bigness a Crine?, 27 LAND EcoN. 287 (1951) ; Rostow and Sachs, Entry into
the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-examined, 61 YALE L. J. 856 (1952);
Stigler, The Case Against Big Business, Fortune, May 1952, pp. 123, 158-167.
3. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALism (1952); LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS, A
NEW ERA (1953) ; Hansen, Maintaining Competition hi Marketing, 21ST BOSTON CON-
FERENcE ON DISTRIBUTION 42 (1949) ; Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied
Economic Theory, 53 Q. J. EcoN. 238 (1949) (henceforth cited Adelman, The A & P
Case); Adelman, Integration and the Antitrust Laws, 63 HARv. L. REV. 27 (1949);
Wright, Toward Coherent Antitrust, 35 VA. L. REv. 665 (1945).
4. United States v. The New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F.Supp.
626 (E.D. Ill. 1946) (henceforth cited: District Court Case); 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
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proposed in the civil suit. Briefly summarized, the suggested remedies
are (1) severance of A & P's manufacturing subsidiaries, (2) dissolution
of its produce-buying and centralized purchasing organization, and (3)
disintegration of retailing into seven independent companies. Issues
similar in their various contexts to those in the A & P cases appear in
other antitrust suits, such as those against the west coast oil companies,
the United Shoe Machinery Corporation,0 the large meat packers," the
du Pont Company,8 and the Western Electric Company. 9 The lengthy
record already existing in the A & P cases, the discussions that have
been inspired by it, and the fact that a civil suit seeking to dissolve the
company is pending, seem to justify an attempt to answer these questions:
(1) Do the Department of Justice and, more important, the courts evince
hostility toward vertical or horizontal integration per se in the A & P
cases? (2) What was the role played by integration in the operation of
the A & P Company? To what extent did it contribute to the firm's
efficiency, as distinct from its bargaining power? (3) Do the remedies
proposed by the government in the civil suit actually threaten the economic
benefits-if any-of integration?
I
MANUFACTURING
Problems of integration arise when a firm encompasses more than
one operation. It may sell in more than one market area or be active in
more than one horizontal stratum. Where this happens, the possibility
arises of unfairness to competitors not similarly equipped because one
function or-at the horizontal level-geographical area may carry a
disproportionate burden of contribution to the return on over-all invest-
ment. If the government accepts the responsibility for preserving com-
petition on an equitable plane, it cannot avoid deciding whether a par-
ticular use of integrated facilities does or does not overstep the limits of
1949) (henceforth cited: Appeals Case) ; also Civil Action No. 52-139, U.S.D.C.S.D.N.Y.,
Sept. 15, 1949.
5. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., Civil Action No. 11584-C, U.S.
D.C.S.D.Cal., May 12, 1950.
6. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
7. United States v. Armour and Co., Civil Action No. 48C-1351, U.S.D.C.N.D.Ill,
Sept. 15, 1948.
8. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Civil Action No. 49C-1071,
U.S.D.C.N.D.Ill., June 30, 1949.
9. United States v. Western Electric Co., Civil Action No. 17-49, U.S.D.C.N.J.,
Jan. 14, 1949.
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fairness, thus defined in terms of disproportionate ° contribution to
over-all return.
On the other hand, it is obvious that to attack all integration that
exposes nonintegrated competitors to competition more strenuous than
they can withstand solely on the basis of their relative efficiency in their
own limited area of operations would be to deny consumers the valid
contribution to efficiency of combining operations.
The government has expressly denied hostility to vertical integra-
tion, as such. It said that it was not attacking A & P's ownership of
manufacturing facilities, but only "abuses" of the power which such
ownership conveyed. Thus, in the criminal information, 24 types of
violations of the Sherman Act were set forth, only 6 of which are at all
related to manufacturing. More precisely, A & P was accused of
(1) threatening to manufacture grocery products in order to extract
illegal discriminatory concessions from suppliers and (2) using the
profits from manufacturing 1 to offset losses in selected retail areas
with the aim of securing predetermined shares in those markets.' 2  In
the offenses charged in the civil suit relating to manufacturing, one
again finds listed what the government thought were abuses: (1) A & P
sold its manufactures to competitors at prices higher than those charged
its own subsidiaries; (2) by entering upon or withdrawing from manu-
facture, A & P depressed its buying prices below those charged to its
competitors; (3) threats of manufacturing for itself were used to obtain
discriminatory prices; (4) profits from sales of manufactured products
to outsiders were used to offset reduced prices on sales to A & P's retail
subsidiaries and were an offset to retail losses.13
These "abuses" of vertical integration, or, as set forth in the civil
suit, the "offenses charged," might without exception be regarded either
as manifestations of the company's buying policy, or else as links to
its allegedly unfairly discriminatory selling-price policies. The latter
will be examined in detail below. If one grants the possible illegality
10. How "disproportionate" must be the returns from different activities before an
illegal "abuse" of integration may be said to have occurred? It is impossible to lay
down arithmetical rules. The courts can decide only on the basis of the historical pattern
of action, the relative size of the protagonists, and the intent deducible therefrom, the
practices in the trade, and the economic impact of the "subsidization," whether an un-
reasonable restraint of trade has been effected.
11. A critic of the Antitrust Division says: "No man can make a profit by selling
to himself." On the other hand, he also speaks of "returns" on manufacturing opera-
tions. Adelman, The A & P Case 245. The crucial question is not whether the
government was guilty of sloppy thinking in employing the concept but whether
the A & P decisions attack the mere enjoyment of the legitimate advantages of inte-
gration.
12. See Gov't Main Brief 3-6, Appeals Case.
13. Civil Action No. 52-139 supra note 4, at Par. 23 A and D.
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of the company's coercive buying tactics 14 and retail pricing policies, to
both of which the condemned manufacturing activities were merely
subsidiary, it would be fair to conclude that the A & P suits do not, at
least on their face, specifically attack vertical integration.
However, it may be that some of the "abuses" condemned by the
government and the courts are not clearly an exercise of coercive bar-
gaining power but are, rather, policies that vertically integrated concerns
should be encouraged to follow. Should not a vertically integrated
grocery chain be encouraged to bargain with its suppliers for lower
prices on the basis of what its own manufacturing costs would be?
Should it not sell commodities to competitors, even though at prices
higher than the (nominal) prices its own retail units are charged ?15 Can
it not do these things without violating the antitrust laws?
One can conceive circumstances in which both of these practices
might be illegal. If A & P drove down its suppliers' prices by threatening
to manufacture-using its successful experience to back up those threats
-while competitors continued to pay higher prices to the same suppliers,
the resultant discrimination might-have been oppressively unfair. The
line between legal and illegal bargaining of this sort is necessarily a fine
one. If A & P thinks that it can manufacture at lower costs than its
suppliers, there can be no reasonable objection to its doing so. But if it
uses its manufacturing facilities as a kind of scarecrow to coerce suppliers
into concessions, it may impose an unreasonable burden on competitors.
Unfortunately, the government's statement of the "offenses" lumps to-
gether these two possible courses of action as parts of a "conspiracy" to
obtain supplies at preferential prices' 6 and blurs the distinction, difficult
14. There have been few tests of the legality of extracting price discriminations
under the Sherman Act. While buying power can obviously be used in such a way
as to violate the Act (note the stress laid on the railroad rebates coercively exacted
by Standard Oil Company in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 32-33, 42, 75-77 (1911); see also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 108
(1948)), this specific use of it is hard to differentiate in practice from any intense
price competition. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals (unani-
mously) decided that A & P's bargaining did overstep the line, admittedly difficult to
draw, between aggressive bargaining leading to beneficial competition and that bargaining
which is a species of unfair competition. The A & P decisions may be compared with
a similar instance of discriminatory pricing, held to be illegal under Section 2 of the
Clayton Act because it substantially lessened competition. George Van Camp & Sons
Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929). There appears to be little, if any, factual
foundation for the hypothesis that A & P's illegal buying activities appreciably bene-
fitted the public. See Dirlam and Kahn, Antitrust Law and the Big Buyer: Aother
Look at the A & P Case, 60 J. PoL. EcoN. 118 (1952).
15. In fact, A & P maintains that it has never sold any of its manufactured
products to competitors. A & P Main Brief 194, Appeals Case; App. A, Vol. I, 335, ibid.
Nowhere in its brief before the Circuit Court in the criminal case does the government
mention sales to outsiders.
16. "The . . . conspiracy . . . has consisted of a continuing agreement . . . to
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enough to make in any case, between legitimate and potentially illegitimate
uses of integration.
If, again, A & P had monopoly power in the supply of some of the
manufactured products which it sold to the trade,1 7 the courts could not
regard with indifference sales to nonintegrated competitors at prices
which subjected the latter to a squeeze, but of course the government
never presented such evidence.'
Apart from the attack on specific practices, there are isolated state-
ments in the government's briefs, which, pieced together, form a picture,
or more accurately, a collage, of Antitrust Division hostility to integration
per se.19 In effect, what these statements say is that A & P's "profits" from
manufacturing enabled it to operate on lower over-all retail'margins than
its nonintegrated competitors. If the employment of its capital in manu-
facturing did provide A & P with a higher return than retailing, or
enabled it to improve the performance of its retail stores, undoubtedly it
could undersell equally large and efficient competitors who might have
embarked all of their capital in retailing. But the government could not
logically attack A & P for this competitive advantage unless it was
prepared to attack any firm which integrates successfully. Successful
integration (whether because it contributes to increased efficiency or
merely circumvents monopolistic suppliers) may confer an advantage
over nonintegrated competitors. The latter may be unable to overcome
this advantage by virtue of their efficiency in retailing alone. But the
incentive and ability of an enterprise to integrate backward is one of the
prime limits on others' monopoly power and, like corporate size itself, is
reasonably condemned under the antitrust laws only on the basis of a far
stronger showing of monopoly danger and abuse than was made in the
case of A & P.
However, it is possible to appeal from the government drunk to the
government sober. Intermixed with a few statements that really attack
integration are others-representing the government's explicit summa-
utilize their food manufacturing plants . . . to insure that defendants secure food both
from their own manufacturing subsidiaries and from other manufacturers at lower
buying prices than those paid by their retail competitors for the same . . . products.(2) By . . . agreeing to abstain from the manufacture of particular foods . . . with
the intent . . . of thereby depressing buying prices to be offered . . . to defendants
for similar products of comparable quality manufactured by other manufacturers...."
Civil Action No. 52-139 supra note 4. However, see Par. 23 D (3), ibid., which spe-
cifically alleges that A & P used its plants to coerce discriminatory concessions.
17. Some such power was enjoyed in the case of produce resold by ACCO. See
p. 8, infra.
18. See note 15 sp ra.
19. See the quotations in Adelman, The A & P Case 244, note 7. See also Gov't
Main Brief 25, 390, Appeals Case; Civil Action 52-139 supra note 4, at Par. 23 E (4).
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tions of its views with respect to integration unaccompanied by "abuse"
-- emphasizing that "the abuse of power arising from integration and
dominant size, and not its mere possession, was the issue." 20  Nor did
the District Court or the Circuit Court adopt the theory that A & P's
manufacturing "profits" were illegal per se. In the decisions the consider-
ation given to A & P's manufacturing facilities is oblique and brief. The
District Court contented itself by saying that the earnings of the manu-
facturing subsidiaries "when coupled with and inextricably interwoven
with the activities of ACCO, reflect inevitably the misuse of defendants'
power in competition .. ."1 The only times Judge Lindley mentions
manufacturing profits are when he cites their use, always in association
with other, coercively exacted "revenues," to "subsidize" retail operations,
both generally and selectively. The Circuit Court concluded that "[t] hese
corporations were tools in the hands of A & P, used and useful in main-
taining the two-price level to enable it to maintain its position of domi-
nance in the retail food business."
'22
It is regrettable that the Antitrust Division and the courts did not
more clearly differentiate between legal and illegal use of the power
enjoyed by a vertically integrated concern. Still, there is little in the
decisions which could serve as a precedent for attacking backward
20. Gov't Main Brief 391, Appeals Case. See also statement of Holmes Baldridge
on oral argument:
"A violation of vertical integration occurs where you take profits illegally secured,
such as the headquarters' allowances profits are, and local allowances too, for that
matter, and stock gains, we claim are illegal profits, most of them, where you credit
all of these illegal profits, along with the profits from their manufacturing subsidiaries,
which are perfectly all right, to turn a losing retail proposition into a profitable retail
operation; we say that that is an abuse of vertical integration ...
JUDGE MAJOR: "Suppose they have legal profits from this manufacturing
business, and they decide they will put all those profits over here in one territory, we
will say where they have got a price war on. . . . Wouldn't that be illegal?
MR. BALDRIDGE: "Yes, sir, if they are selling below cost in that area for
the purpose of driving out competition, and they attempt to cover up that loss by
crediting profits, even though they are legally earned profits, that is a violation of the
Sherman Act."
Oral argument for the government by Holmes Baldridge, Jan. 6, 1949, Transcript of
Record 213-214, Appeals Case.
21. District Court Case, 67 F.Supp. at 678. Only to the extent that one feels
justified in extracting from such statements the implication that manufacturing or other
headquarters profits, untainted in their source, and not associated with other tainted
profits, might not legally be used to permit generally low retail margins, can one find
here an opposition to vertical integration per se. The reader will note the similarity
between this general view of Judge Lindley's and that of Holmes Baldridge, supra
note 20. And Baldridge makes it quite clear that the only way in which manufacturing
profits are objectionable is in their comminglizg with other, illegal "profits" to sub-
sidize retailing in general or in their use selectively to subsidize local price-cutting.
See his oral argument, op. cit. at 217-219.
22. Appeals Case, 173 F.2d at 86.
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vertical integration unaccompanied by a pattern of buying and selling
policies approximating A & P's.
It is not clear how great was the contribution of A & P's manu-
facturing to its competitive position. It is possible that both the govern-
ment and its critics have exaggerated its importance. 23 There are corpo-
rate chains (to name a few, Food Fair, Grand Union, Loblaw's, Albers
Supermarkets, Inc.) and voluntary or cooperative chains (IGA, Red
and White, NAROG) which do no manufacturing yet have provided
keen competition for A & P and other corporate integrated chains. There
appears to be no correlation between either size or profitability of grocery
chains and the extent of vertical integration. 24
However, the argument is not being advanced that such considera-
tions should have entered into the deliberations in the A & P case. It
was not incumbent on the government, before complaining of A & P's
use of vertical integration, to examine the relative efficiency of the
Company's manufacturing or its integrated facilities. The legality or
illegality of A & P's actions-and it is actions which the antitrust laws
proscribe---could never be determined by such a comparison. Decisions
about short or long-run efficiency should, of course, be left to business-
men. If they find it desirable to integrate backward (whether because
they think they can do the job more efficiently or merely to participate
in monopoly returns being earned upstream), they should be free to do
so without having to demonstrate to outsiders that returns are thereby
increased.2 5
23. For computations showing "returns" of 50 to 100 percent annually on capital
invested in manufacturing, see ADELMAN, THE DO16INANT Fiaa, WITH SPEcIAL
REFERENCE TO THE A & P TEA Co. 405, 408 (unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard, 1948).
A & P's failure to expand its manufacturing facilities during the period in which these
extraordinary returns are said to have been earned casts doubt on their meaningful-
ness. None of the competitors of A & P interviewed by the authors, even those who
did their own manufacturing, believed that a dollar invested in manufacturing would
increase net income so much more than a dollar invested in retailing, or that A & P
actually enjoyed "profits" of such magnitude. Private label merchandise can often
be purchased as cheaply as it can be manufactured. It was conceded that the "middle-
man" was eliminated, but of course not all of his selling costs are avoidable. For
example, reduction in advertising expenditures may be offset by reduced turnover.
24. A & P was not, at the time of the criminal trial, by any means the most
highly integrated chain. HARDY, THE INTEGRATION OF MANUFACTURING AND CHAIN
DISTRIBUTION-WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FOOD PRODUCTS (unpublished doctoral
thesis, University of Minnesota, 1947), passim. A & P's propensity to shift back
and forth from self-supply to outside purchasing seems to demonstrate that the
savings from manufacturing were not appreciably larger than the returns the Com-
pany could achieve on capital tied up in purchases from independent suppliers. A & P
Main Brief, App. A, Vol. I, 372-375, Appeals Case; Gov't Brief 130-132, District Court
Case.
25. It has been suggested that "economic policy should be based on actual facts
about the relative efficiency of integrated and nonintegrated firms." Adelman, The
A & P Case 246. If a business concern makes things for years which could be made
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Against this background there is the government's proposal that the
manufacturing facilities be divested from the balance of the A & P
organization. It appears that the only justified attacks were not really
against manufacturing itself but on associated buying power and policies
or geographic dispersion and selling policies. The threat to manufacture
rather than manufacturing itself was asserted to be a club with which
concessions were obtained; manufacturing profits were an integral part of
a scheme to subsidize retail stores selectively. Apart from these abuses of
economic power derived from vertical integration, there appear to be none
which could be considered forthrightly unjustified.
On the theory that that punishment is best which fits the crime, and
that power is best dissipated which has actually been abused or is most
susceptible to abuse, the divorce of A & P's manufacturing facilities
seems the least felicitous proposal of the Department of Justice. Certainly
the considerable contribution which backward integration may make to
effective competition offers an additional cause for restraint. The burden
of proof would seem to rest on the government to show that injunctions
against specific practices found objectionable, combined with direct
attacks on the power which made the abuses possible (the concerted
buying and the dispersed geographic operations), would be an inadequate
substitute for divestiture of manufacturing.
II
A & P's BUYING ORGANIZATIONS AND PROCEDURES
a. ACCO
In the civil suit the government has asked for the dissolution of
ACCO (A & P's produce-buying subsidiary) and for the prohibition of
any future A & P-owned organization buying produce and selling it
both to the retail organization and to the trade. Does this program repre-
sent government hostility to a form of backward integration per se?
Was ACCO's offense nothing more than its superior efficiency as a
purchasing instrument? Will the suggested dissolution and prohibition
of resale of produce to competitors mean higher costs and higher prices
to the public?
According to Judge Lindley A & P was convicted by "ACCO's
tainted record," which permeated "all the operations of A & P's inte-
more cheaply "on the outside," this is, it is said, objectionable. Just how such pig-
headedness could be dealt with by the Antitrust Division is not made clear, nor is
condemnation of the practice reconciled with an earlier defense of long-period losses
in retail units; id. at 239-244.
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grated system."' 20 The nature of ACCO's taint was clear enough; it
consisted of (1) taking advantage of its bargaining power to extract
discriminatory concessions from produce suppliers, (2) using its buying
power to force growers and shippers to sell exclusively through it; (3)
using its large purchases from other middlemen to induce them in turn
to patronize it, with the resultant conferring on A & P of unfair advan-
tages over retail competitors, and (4) extracting low LCL prices and
double brokerage from produce jobbers under threat of withdrawal of
A & P's good will.2 7 The Circuit Court repeated these conclusions . 2
In short, the evils of ACCO, as related in both the District and
Circuit Court opinions, are found in the way in which it operated-
exploiting its "inconsistent functions" as Judge Lindley put it-rather
than its backward integration per se. Even if the Department of Justice
has its way in the civil suit, none of the seven independent retailing
organizations into which A & P will be split will be prohibited from
setting up its own produce-buying subsidiary. Hostility to backward
integration itself is perhaps evidenced in Paragraph 23.B(13) of the
26. District Court Case, 67 F.Supp. at 678.
27. Id. at 655-659. An example of the use of the heavy purchases for A & P to
enhance ACCO's income as broker for the trade is revealed in the following excerpt
from an inter-office memorandum in ACCO's Plant City, Florida, office: "We are
usually able to realize auction average prices for any of our offerings in this [the
Cincinnati] market due to the fact that so many of the auction buyers do business
with us on other commodities and in this way we are able to ask them for support on
any of our auction cars." Government Exhibit No. 2355, Transcript of Record 8740,
District Court Case.
28. We do not attempt to determine here whether the courts and the government
were correct in concluding that the cash differential given to ACCO by suppliers
exceeded the shipper's savings in cost on these sales. There is much evidence to the
contrary. See A & P Reply Brief, Part I, 205-210, Appeals Case. On the other hand,
the government was not, as is so often contended, necessarily forcing sellers to dis-
criminate against A & P by attacking ACCO's attempts to obtain the equivalent of
brokerage on its direct purchases. Sixty-five percent of ACCO's purchases were at
the point of shipment. A & P Main Brief 134, Appeals Case. Terminal market whole-
salers and chains without field organizations likewise do a large volume of direct
produce buying through buying brokers or agents. They pay the commission of the
buying broker, just as A & P pays the expenses of its field organization. Thus the
same price on both sales means the same net-back to the seller; A & P pays no
"phantom brokerage." Moreover, even if, for instance, a grower "rolls" a car of
lettuce to a terminal market, meanwhile notifying a selling broker to get the best
possible price for it, and at the same time sells a car to A & P at the shipping point,
he still does not necessarily discriminate against A & P, even though the latter does
not get brokerage and the receiver does. The price that the selling broker will ulti-
mately be able to get, after the car arrives, will almost certainly not be the same as
the price ACCO paid at the time of shipment; produce prices change from one hour
to the next. Therefore, the net-back that an individual shipper obtains on sales to
ACCO may or may not be the same as on sales through brokers four or five days
hence. Cf. Adelman, The A & P Case 249: ". . . [A] system of identical list prices
to all buyers (which means diverse net prices) weakens the urge to find or set up
cheaper distribution methods." In the produce business there are, of course, no "list
prices."
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complaint in the civil suit, where it is alleged that ACCO's profits on sales
to defendants' competitors and on brokerage transactions for others than
A & P were allocated to the retail stores. But this is a minor point under
the main rubric of "systematic discriminatory price preferences." Again,
Judge Lindley's opinion seems to imply at times that any profits on
resales to competitors would be tainted. In fact, however, the District
Court was clearly influenced primarily by the tactics described above.
Admitting the abuses of ACCO's power-or at least the reasonable-
ness of the conclusion of the Department of Justice and the courts that
those powers were abused-the question remains whether ACCO does
not, nevertheless, provide an efficient method of buying and distributing
produce. By virtue of its size and methods of operation alone, does it not
permit savings that are unavailable to A & P's competitors, savings
distinct from those attributable to coercive bargaining? ACCO has field
men at the most important shipping points and at strategically located
distributing depots and maintains about 50 terminal offices. The terminal
offices are organized in divisions coextensive with the retail divisions.
They receive information on shipments and prices from, and send instruc-
tions to, the field men. Obviously ACCO permits certain savings to
A & P: As the season advances the field men can move from one
locality to another, following the produce "deals," while the produce
warehouses can be located to serve a retail unit with maximum effi-
ciency. 29 Coordination of purchases among divisions can re-route cars
already rolling to minimize waste and spoilage.
Nevertheless, to conclude that ACCO is helpful to A & P is not to
demonstrate that it represents a buying instrument significantly more
efficient than those employed by A & P's rivals, or that its methods
are significantly superior to those that will be available to A & P's
successors. First of all, the direct buying which ACCO does for A & P
can be done as well by many of A & P's competitors-without maintain-
ing a staff of their own field men.30 Secondly, A & P's successors will
29. Harvey Baum, then head of ACCO, claimed that its system of distribution
permitted savings of $49 per car compared with the terminal auction system. A & P
Main Brief 117, Appeals Case. This saving is not an accurate measure of ACCO's
superior efficiency since, as is pointed out infra, there are many other methods of
obtaining produce besides auction purchases at terminal markets.
30. Even individual supermarkets can, and do, buy directly, either from the
shipper or through a buying broker, large-volume produce items like potatoes or citrus
fruits. Hence, relatively small chains can realize a large part of what savings derive
from direct purchases, even though they do not have field men permanently on their
staffs. Brokers are equally capable of selecting superior produce, looking after claims,
and offer the additional advantage of not having to be paid except when their services
are used. H. C. Bohack, a chain operating in the Brooklyn and Long Island area with
about 3 percent of A & P's annual sales volume, makes about 10 percent of its produce
purchases at the Washington Street Market. It has built up its direct carload buying
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undoubtedly find it profitable and possible to operate through strategically
located warehouses, as many of its competitors now do, thus avoiding
recourse to inefficient terminal markets. Finally, it is not always more
advantageous to buy directly; it is frequently more economical to make
use of the facilities of terminal market wholesalers. 31 Therefore, little
relevance can be attached to the fact that ACCO's operating costs are
lower than those of independent produce wholesalers ;32 they perform
different functions33 and are utilized at different times and under different
circumstances by A & P as well as others.34 A comparison of A & P's
produce costs with those of, for example, Penn Fruit in Philadelphia,
Stop N Shop in Boston, or Albers Supermarkets in Cincinnati would
be more pertinent; but it would fail to show the dramatic cost differences
that appear when ACCO is measured against the "average" terminal
market wholesaler.35
Moreover, small buyers may enjoy offsetting advantages of flexi-
bility.36 Any chain with alert produce buyers, who have available to
as much as possible. Grand Union, operating retail stores on Manhattan Island, and
with somewhat higher annual revenues than Bohack, currently purchases no more than 20
percent of its produce at the Washington Street Market. This is the only terminal
market for produce of any importance in the New York metropolitan area. New
York Times, Aug. 4, 1953, p. 23, § 2, col. 6-7.
31. When market prices are slumping, it is obviously better business to patronize
a terminal market, where superior produce can be purchased at lower prices than
would have been charged several days earlier at the shipping point. Of course, chains
and independents alike tend to reduce direct purchases in periods of falling markets.
32. Adelman, The A & P Case 249.
33. Phillips, A Critical Analysis of Recent Literature Dealing with Marketing
Efficiency, 5 J. MARKEriNG 360 (1941).
34. A & P Main Brief 112-113, Appeals Case. Terminal market wholesalers, who
do a large part of their business in LCL lots with jobbers-and with A & P itself-
and who operate in confined quarters often located where the produce has to be handled
and transshipped two or three times, as in the Washington Market in New York City,
must inevitably have higher costs than a wholesaler who does most of his business by
the carload through a few strategically located warehouses. Furthermore, the spread
in the gross margins of the 2 percent sample relied on by Adelman, The A & P Case
249, is so large as to make averages of little reliability. Margins ranged from 5.83 to
15.7 percent of sales. SURVEY OF FRESH FRUIT AND VEGETABLE WHOLESALERS 3, Table 3
(OPA Economic Data Series, No. 12, 1947). On the functions of chain produce-buying
subsidiaries as compared with independent wholesalers, see GERREALD, AN ECONOMuIC
STUDY OF FRUIT AND VEGETABLE WHOLESALING AND JOBBING FIRMS IN NEW YORK
CITY (Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 721, 1939);
HOFFTMAN and BEVAN, CHAIN STORE DISTRIBUTION OF FRUITS AND VEGETABLES IN THE
NORTHEASTERN STATES (U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1937).
35. Incidentally, some of these wholesalers, operating in modern, low-cost locations
like the Providence or Buffalo (Niagara Frontier Terminal) markets, have operating
costs very close to ACCO's.
36. For instance, a manager of a wholesale member of NAROG said that he
trucked out groceries and picked up potatoes for the return trip, while A & P would
typically have only a one-way load; and, because of direct connections vith shippers,
he could get watermelons quicker than A & P stores in his district, which had to
depend on the unit's parcelling out the watermelons. It was pointed out that small
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them detailed information on shipments and market prices throughout
the United States provided by the Department of Agriculture or Crispo
teletype services and other varied sources of market information (some
of it made available by ACCO itself), can certainly come close to off-
setting whatever advantages A & P derives from its field organization.
Finally, the paramount determinant of profit or loss on produce is the
treatment it gets in the retail store, rather than quality37 or concessions
at the time of purchase; in providing good handling, the independent
store is at least in as favorable a position as A & P.
There is a strong feeling in the trade that the extensive field organi-
zation maintained by ACCO is a price A & P must pay for its size rather
than a net competitive advantage. Given A & P's gigantic daily require-
ments of produce, ACCO is probably essential to it. Thus, the company
continues to maintain ACCO even though it cannot legally collect broker-
age and therefore must have higher costs than the rivals who negotiate
directly with the shipper; and it may in some cases be at a disadvantage
when compared with competitors who can avoid the overhead expense of
maintaining the field men by using buying brokers. None of this is to
deny that ACCO was a very efficient and successful organization, in large
measure because of the efforts of its dynamic and extremely capable
manager, Harvey Baum.
Under these circumstances, it would seem unrealistic to contend that
ACCO represents so greatly superior a method of obtaining produce that
its dissolution would be economically undesirable. There is little reason
to believe that the seven independent chains proposed to be created out
of the A & P organization would be any less efficient than the parent in
their produce buying. The District Court may reasonably conclude that
a chain doing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of business will
handle produce ju'st as efficiently, or at worst almost as efficiently, as one
grossing $3 billion a year. 38
chains, like Boston's Star Markets, with no warehouse expense, could market produce
at lower cost than any large competitor. See also Dirlam and Kahn, supra note 14,
at 126-127.
37. It is not feasible to appraise the extent to which the government's allegation
is valid that A & P was able through ACCO to corral the best grade merchandise and
to leave inferior produce for its competitors. In general, premium prices must be paid
for superior produce, no matter who buys it. Attempts to compare the quality of
produce sold by different chains or different stores have not been successful; it is very
difficult to rate produce in retail stores. Moreover, the handling in the store may
often be more important in determining the quality when it is offered to the retail
consumer than the grade at the time of purchase from the shipper.
38. Other observers have suggested that the economies of bulk purchasing are
fully attained at a fairly early stage. Hirsch and Votaw, Giant Grocery Retailing and
the Antitrust Laws. 23 J. Bus. 5 (1952).
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Granting that the distintegration of ACCO would have little harmful
effect on the cost of handling produce, is it desirable? Would it provide
a remedy for the objectionable types of bargaining attacked by the
government in the criminal suit 9 and set forth again in the complaint
in the civil suit?
The problem of selecting a proper technique for dealing with
illegal practices must be faced. To begin with, it is relatively easy for
the government to insist upon and enforce a prohibition of trade sales,
so that ACCO's inconsistent functions could be ended by injunction.40
ACCO would remain, however, the biggest single purchaser of produce,
and the volume of business it could give or withhold from single suppliers
would make it potentially dangerous. 41 To devise a decree that would
prevent recurrent use of illegal bargaining pressure would be almost
impossible and would require continuous supervision to insure that the
boundary line between coercion and legitimate haggling was not over-
stepped. The simple solution is to provide the produce supplier with more
alternatives: Seven ACCOs instead of one.
b. Central Buying Offices
The A & P Company centralized its purchases of items other than
produce through a Headquarters Purchasing Department and associated
39. We have already, in our study of A & P's buying policies, attempted to appraise
the contention that the exercise of monopsonistic power-to which Professor Galbraith
has since applied the appellation of "countervailing power"-even in violation of the
traditional antitrust laws and Robinson-Patman, may make a contribution to workable
competition. See Dirlan and Kahn, supra note 14; Dirlam and Kahn, A Reply, 61
J. POL. EcoN. 441 (1953). Hence, we refrain here from debating whether the pressures
applied by ACCO on its suppliers and customers, complained of by the government,
might have been in the public interest. Professor Galbraith's defense of A & P's monop-
sonistic practices is entirely theoretical. He makes no attempt to find out, from the
facts, to what extent this power was in fact "countervailing," to what extent exploita-
tive, to what extent it (as contrasted with other legally unassailable advantages) actually
contributed to the effectiveness of chain store competition. His apparent implication that
monopsony power is generally acceptable and cannot be exploitative ("such an oppor-
tunity exists only when their suppliers are enjoying something which can be taken
away .... " GALBRAITii, AmERICAN CAPITALISm 124 (1952)), the big buyer serving
as buying agent for the unorganized consumer, does not seem on all fours with his
general approval of labor unions, whose growth he attributes (again in oversimplified
fashion) largely to the necessity for meeting the exploitative monopsony power of the
big corporation. (Significantly, four of our six largest national unions face employers
who are unconcentrated and poorly organized.)
40. ACCO stopped trade sales after the decision in the criminal case.
41. See discussion of this point in Dirlam and Kahn, supra note 14. We
contended there that ACCO probably did not enjoy superior coverage of the market;
and that it was in no position regularly to pay substantially less than its competitors.
This does not exclude, however, the possibility that it did obtain some discriminatory
concessions. See Gov't Main Brief 264-268, Appeals Case, setting forth the Company's
effort to perpetuate, under other names, the brokerage which it had been receiving
from shippers on sales to A & P prior to the Robinson-Patman Act.
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buying offices. Some of these buying offices operated in the field, while
the tea and poultry departments were in New York. Some buying has
always been done at the divisional level, but by and large "all big deals"
were made at headquarters 42 and "control and responsibility for all
buying, for stocking any item and standardization of the quality of mer-
chandise rested with the Headquarters Purchasing Department.
43
It was through these department and field buying offices that the
illegal buying tactics (other than those associated with ACCO's activities)
were carried out. Accordingly, the government has asked for their
abolition.44
Nowhere in the opinions of Judges Lindley or Minton can there be
found a condemnation of the backward integration entailed in centralized
purchasing. Instead, the former emphasized the ways in which the pur-
chasing departments had been "taking advantage of ... buying power, ' '45
obtaining special concessions such as advertising allowances and discounts
in lieu of brokerage, and trying to force sellers to give up the use of
brokers.46 The Circuit Court did refer to the contribution made by the
special allowances obtained through the centralized purchasing depart-
ments to A & P's total profits ;47 but it went on to say: "It is the predatory
method through which this accumulation of profits and allowances is
obtained . .. that is challenged by the government. 4
8
There is little doubt that A & P still enjoys some (immeasurable)
monopsonistic power. Its purchases of some items, concentrated in a single
market like Chicago, have been sufficient to influence prices appreciably. 49
Although there is no evidence that the Company has ever actually exer-
cised this power to manipulate meat or butter quotations generally, 50
there is no question that in specific instances, when dealing with individual
suppliers, the power of the centralized buying offices was exerted to
42. Government Exhibit 103, abstracted A & P Main Brief, App. II, 22, Appeals
Case.
43. A & P Main Brief 68, Appeals Case.
44. Civil Action 52-139, supra note 4, Prayer, Par. 9.
45. District Court Case, 67 F.Supp. at 639.
46. Id. at 643-654.
47. Appeals Case, 173 F.2d at 83.
48. Id. at 86.
49. "We are the biggest factors in the Chicago market, and other houses as well
as the government agencies look to us for guidance and advice, knowing that we are
closer to the situation than anyone else because of our large receipts." Transcript of
Record 8758, District Court Case. Hence, A & P refrained from putting its own man
on the Commodity Exchange but always bought through brokers so that its purchases
would not be identified.
50. On one occasion, at least, an A & P official recommended a change in the
scheduling of purchases in order to cause a break in livestock prices. See letter from
T. A. Connor, who headed the National Meat Department, Government Exhibit 2355,
Transcript of Record 8737, ibid.
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elicit special favors. 51 The question, then, centers on the appropriateness
of the remedy proposed by the government to prevent repetition of the
abuse of this power-dissolution of the centralized purchasing depart-
ments.
One important question, again, is whether such a change would
appreciably reduce the efficiency of the successor companies in purchasing.
It is even more difficult to reach conclusions about the contributions made
to A & P's overall efficiency by its centralized purchasing of nonproduce
items than to pass judgment on ACCO. A & P's field buying offices
permitted it to correlate information on canning conditions and prices
in New York State, the Middle West, and the South; its Chicago offices
kept it in direct contact with the meat and butter markets. However,
developments in the industry have made available to even very small
chains opportunities for getting groceries, meats, and canned goods at
relatively low cost. 52
The second question is whether dissolution of the headquarters
buying offices will dissipate the power to demand discriminatory buying
concessions. This proposal is, of course, only part of the government's
over-all plan for reorganization of the A & P Company and cannot be
considered in isolation from the proposed retail disintegration. Pre-
sumably, the seven independent retailing organizations would be free to set
up their purchasing systems on a basis parallel to that of the ci-devant
51. Again, as in the case of ACCO, we must be careful not to generalize from the
instances which the government was able to bring to light concerning the prevalence
-of illegal buying practices. As A & P points out, it dealt with some 25,000 suppliers,
yet as of October 28, 1936, it had only 22 quantity discount agreements, and as of
November 10, 1941, only 71. A & P Reply Brief, Pt. I, 97, Appeals Case. At another
point, the Company said it had only 17 cost saving agreements. Id. at 109. Infre-
quency of such arrangements would not be pertinent to a decision about the Company's
guilt under the criminal sections of the Sherman Act. It might, as will be brought
out infra, be of importance in deciding upon a remedy in a civil suit.
Of course, the Company might have received discriminatory concessions from sup-
pliers with whom it did not have permanent contractual relations. See Florida Citrus
Canners Cooperative, FTC Docket No. 5640, Findings as to the Facts and Conclusions,
July 14, 1952. A & P was given the March 18, 1946, price on canned grapefruit juice
as late as April 22, by which time prices to other customers had advanced by 37 percent,
or 8.8c per 46-oz. can.
52. The large packers have devised a system which permits direct shipment of
good quality meat to small buyers from the main plant, circumventing the branch
salesmen. Armours calls this a Q & D (quantity and direct sales) account; Swifts.
STA (sold to arrive). The competitors interviewed believed that, since the period
covered in the A & P trial, they had not been at a serious disadvantage in purchasing
groceries and canned goods. As far as nationally advertised goods are concerned, every-
one is on the same footing: The maximum discount applies to a carload purchase of
soap, corn-flakes, Kraft cheese, etc. As for private label canned goods, there is
confidence among smaller chains and voluntaries that they can rely on brokers or
direct negotiation with those few canners not using brokers to put these goods on their
shelves about as cheaply as on A & P's. Canning is an extremely competitive industry
and is represented by some 2,000 competing brokers.
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A & P. While they might be tempted to apply the same techniques
that the courts found objectionable in the A & P cases, their economic
power would be relatively limited. Of course, it should be recognized
that not all the cases of illegal concessions brought forward in the trial
were negotiated by headquarter's purchasers.53 Once the retail organiza-
tion has been shrunk, however, it is doubtful if preferences of this kind
would as easily take on an illegal character.
The final question is whether dissipation of this concerted buying
power is necessary, or whether a less drastic step like an injunction would
suffice. In deciding this the District Court will probably want to deter-
mine if, as the government asserts, A & P is still using centralized
purchasing to extract illegal discounts despite the verdict in the criminal
case.54 The evidence available to outsiders is not clear. Some competitors
and suppliers interviewed ventured the opinion that the Company is
bending over backward to avoid being accused of exercising illegal pres-
sure. Before receiving an advertising allowance, A & P today requires
the supplier to fill out an elaborate questionnaire that goes into great
detail about the nature of agreements with other customers.55 However,
there is still widespread belief in the trade that a buyer as powerful as
A & P would inevitably obtain preferences in one form or another.
The District Court may therefore conclude that policing negotiations
between officials of A & P headquarters and suppliers to make sure that
discriminatory concessions are not received in defiance of an injunction
would present an impossible task, requiring as much time and effort as
the preparation of the criminal case itself whenever violations were
thought to have occurred. If so, abolition of the present system of
centralized purchasing would seem to be the only feasible solution to
the problem.
If the Company had been guilty of abusing its power, and if its
concentration of power was such that it could substantially affect market
prices, at least in the short run,56 and if the issuance of a decree for-
bidding the continuance of specific practices is unenforceable, then cer-
tainly the dissolution of the instrument through which the power was
illegally exercised is a defensible solution for the government to propose.57
53. Vide, the Albany Packing Co., Boston Sausage & Provision Co., I. J. Grass
Noodle Co., Illinois Meat Co., and Mrs. Baird's Bread Co. histoires. A & P Main
Brief 229, 242, 251, 264; App. II, 320-324, Appeals Case.
54. Civil Action 52-139 supra note 4, at Par. 23 A.
55. For instance, Question 4 reads as follows: "Is any customer required to
render greater services than A & P? If so, is he allowed a proportionally greater
amount?" Question 5: "If the contract provides for payment of flat sum, how is this
arrived at?" Question 8: "Does the supplier insist upon compliance with the contract?"
56. It should again be emphasized that this power was not utilized to manipulate
market prices. See Dirlam and Kahn, supra note 14, at 127.
57. It might be argued, of course, that dissolution is a punishment, rather than a
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III
HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION
Horizontal integration-the operation of more than one unit of
business at the same marketing level-offers opportunities for anti-
competitive manipulations as well as for enhancing efficiency. As pointed
out earlier, horizontal integration might possibly be abused when A & P
accepts low returns or losses58 in some of its stores and makes up the
difference from other outlets operating outside the area. But the mere
fact of differing rates of return in different stores is not enough in
itself to demonstrate an illegal abuse of power nor should it be. Such a
doctrine would prevent A & P's reaching out for additional business,
over which to spread an already incurred item of overhead cost, by
charging only the incremental cost of that business. In short, it might
deny to the customer the cost- and price-reducing benefits of integrated
operations. Another related objection to requiring that a "normal profit"
be earned on each operation is that it prevents management from adopt-
ing a policy of promotional pricing-that is, accepting a low return
temporarily in order to build up a larger volume of business which will
in turn permit normal profits to be earned on the lower mark-up. In
appraising the retailing aspects of the A & P case, it is necessary to
inquire first whether the Antitrust Division and the courts condemned
either the legitimate savings on the economically beneficial competitive
tactics of horizontal integration, and second, what consequences may be
anticipated if the government's remedy is imposed.
a. The Courts and A & P's Retail Tactics
The critics of the A & P decisions concede that predatory competi-
tion on a discriminatory basis is and should be illegal. 59 How, then, do
they defend the Company's practices in retailing?
remedy, and that it is too drastic in view of the small number of cases where A & P
was proved to have misused its bargaining power. The Supreme Court refers to
divestiture as a "harsh remedy" in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593, 602 (1951). But presumably a remedy is harsh only if it results in financial loss
to somebody. There was no showing that the divestment requested by the government in
the Timken case would cause unemployment or a drop in profits, nor could any such
showing be reasonably made in the A & P case.
58. A & P retail stores, grouped as units or divisions, compute financial state-
ments on a monthly, quarterly, and yearly basis. Only the yearly statements fully
credit the stores on the basis of sales volume with earnings from manufacturing,
quantity discounts received by headquarters, etc. A. & P officials spoke of stores, units or
divisions operating "in the red" or suffering "losses," even when they were unprofitable
only before receiving their pro rata allocation of these credits from headquarters.
59. "Admittedly, it may be hard at times to draw the line between 'predatory' and
'competitive' price-cutting. This is particularly true where an integrated concern, with
sizeable financial resources is involved... ." Note, Trouble Begins in the "New" Sherman
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First Defense: That A & P's price cutting was promotional; the
Company did it in hopeof increasing volume; this is the way in which
price competition works ;6o therefore, it scarcely behooves the enforce-
ment agencies to condemn a company for suffering losses or accepting
low returns, under the terms of a statute whose purpose is to encourage
price competition.
A reading of the decisions of the District and Circuit Courts supplies
very little foundation for the conclusion that the A & P case was a blow
against legitimate promotional pricing. There are several reasons why
the courts might have been justified in characterizing A & P's price
cutting as unreasonable or predatory. 61 First, losses 62 were sustained
in some territories for very long periods of time. In the Boston and
Springfield Units, for example, losses (after credits from headquarters)
were suffered for five years in succession. The Los Angeles Unit lost
$1,406,194 during the years 1932-1940, when it was continuously in the
red.63 The low margins which produced these losses were in a sense
Act: The Perplexing Story of the A & P Case, 58 Yale L.J. 969, 977 (1949). The
same Note goes on to say, ".. . price reductions which would not have raised an
eyebrow if considered individually, somehow acquired an aura of illegality when
practiced by one big firm." Id. at 978. There is nothing mystifying about this "aura
of illegality;" an individual price cut does not constitute discrimination. Adelman, in a
footnote, backs into an admission that A & P might have been guilty of illegal conduct:
"Incidentally, if we add the allowances, discounts, and buying-office profits back into
the profits of local A & P areas . . . then most of the bases for thinking that Company
sold below cost in selected geographical areas in order to drive out competition apparently
disappear. But there is general agreement that such conduct, if it did exist, would be
an unmitigated burden on competition. Since no issue of principle is involved, this
charge has not been discussed at length." Adelman, The A & P Case 244-245 n.7. "This
charge" was the heart of the government's case.
60. Id. at 241-242.
61. As should be apparent from our discussion, we do not pretend to be able to
offer a brief rule which will enable a judge or the Antitrust Division to separate predatory
from legitimate promotional pricing activities. The task is admittedly difficult, but
no one doubts that it must be undertaken. See note 10 supra, and note 79 infra.
62. The word "loss" is used here advisedly to mean failure of a unit at the end of
the year to return enough profit to cover allocated administrative overhead and other
overhead costs (or in extreme cases, failure to cover even direct operating expenses)
after proportionate credits from Headquarters for quantity discounts, allowances, ACCO
profits, coffee, bakery, butter and cheese profits, subsidiary manufacturing profits, and
stock gains. See Gov't Main Brief 374-382, Appeals Case.
Measuring retail profits in this fashion is perhaps unduly generous to the retailing
function because it tends to minimize the extent to which retailing fails to carry its
proportionate burden of expense. It is not wholly justifiable to credit an A & P retail
unit with all of the profits on products of a manufacturing subsidiary sold by its stores.
The efficiency of the manufacturing subsidiary is best measured by having it transfer its
output at competitive, open-market prices. From its profits, thus arrived at, should be
deducted some hypothetical normal to arrive at that part of the "manufacturing profit"
attributable to the integrated relation between the seller and buyer. Only this differential
is properly allocable to retailing if the purpose is to discover whether retailing is being
"subsidized."
63. See Gov't Main Brief 375, Appeals Case, and A & P Reply Brief, Pt. I, 485,
ibid.
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"promotional"-A & P wanted to increase its share of the market. But
the courts might reasonably feel that no company should be allowed,
merely because it is wealthy, to compete at a loss for a five or eight year
period in some of its markets. 64
Secondly, the "promotional pricing" defense overlooks the discri-
minatory feature of A & P's long-term losses.6 5 While the Los Angeles,
Cincinnati, Boston, Springfield, and Seattle units were losing money for
four years and more in a row, other divisions and units were profitable
and subsidizing66 large numbers of unprofitable stores. The subsidy
was not an accident; divisional boards of directors voted their apprecia-
tion to the management for being permitted to operate "without making a
profit on our store operations."' 7
Second defense: That even if A & P were engaged in discriminatory
price cutting, its actions were defensive and designed merely to meet
competition, not destroy it.68
Many of the losses were in fact forced upon the Company. However,
there were also numerous instances, discussed at length in Judge Lindley's
opinion, of A & P employees threatening or trying to put specific rivals
out of business. 9 Without trying to reach a conclusion here about how
typical these tactics were or how many rivals actually were bankrupted, 7°
there would certainly be agreement that a practice of selling some items
far below the normal mark-up, or at a loss, in order to "turn the heat"
on individual competitors may provide reasonable grounds for the con-
64. We refrain from pursuing the problems of the Company's intent in taking
losses of this magnitude. If losses were incurred after all credits over several years,
they were certainly "intended," if only in the sense that they were the necessary
consequences of a deliberate pricing policy, resulting in the inadequate gross profit
rate. We examine later the question of the purpose of the Company, vis-a-vis its
competitors in accepting long-period losses. According to Adelman's interpretation, the
losses resulted from an attempt to realize, at a larger volume of business, a lower
expense rate per unit. However, A & P itself, or at least its lawyers, deny that it
ever intended to run a store at a loss for over a year and attributes losses not to
promotional pricing policy but to ineptitude of management or to long-term leases. "No
program was ever planned which called for a net loss." A & P Main Brief 201,
Appeals Case. See also, with regard to policies in particular divisions and units, A & P
Reply Brief, Pt. I, 305, 307, 321, ibid.
65. Adelman's discussion of A & P's "promotional pricing" policy, supra note 59,
nowhere mentions that what the government objected to was price discrimination.
66. Lest we forget, it was A & P, not the government, that first employed the word
"subsidy" to describe the process by which certain units or divisions were enabled to
operate for lengthy periods without a profit, or at less than normal profit. For three
separate instances of use by A & P officials of the term "subsidy," see Gov't Brief
833, 909, 931, District Court Case.
67. See Gov't Brief 100, ibid; Government Exhibit 140, p. 2, ibid.
68. See A & P Main Brief 39-56, Appeals Case.
69. District Court Case, 67 F.Supp. at 664-671.
70. As a matter of fact, the cases related by the government in its brief are not
convincing on this score. Compare Gov't Main Brief 93-94, Appeals Case, with A & P
Reply Brief, Pt. I, 353-359, ibid.
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clusion that A & P did employ predatory competitive tactics. 71 Likewise
indicative of a predatory policy was A & P's practice of meeting below-
cost prices of competing stores on specific items and then holding the
price at the unprofitable level for weeks in order to punish the price
cutter.72
Third defense: That A & P was not pre-empting, as the government
alleged, an "ever increasing share of the grocery market."7 3
It is true that A & P's share of the total sales of grocery and com-
bination stores rose slightly from 1929 to 1941 and dropped from 1941
to 1949, never exceeding fourteen percent. Nor have its sales much
exceeded thirty percent of all chain store grocery sales in the past ten
years. 74 On the other hand, A & P did strive to attain a minimum share
of the business-usually about twenty percent-in most communities in
which it had stores.7 5 In twenty-three towns in the Central Division,
the Company did approximately half the grocery business. 70 Furthermore,
Judge Lindley in his opinion cited government data showing that in
1941 A & P had eight units where it did over fifteen percent of the busi-
ness, compared with only one such unit in the period 1925-1926. 7 7
Th6 government did not show that the markets where A & P did
over half the business had been won by discriminatory pricing; the
market shares might have been high merely because the towns were too
small to support more than a few stores. There is no question that the
A & P record is devoid of evidence drawing a clear line of causation
from illegal practices to an increasing market share for the offender, or
to a decline in the intensity of competition. But there is also no doubt that
A & P's discriminatory tactics, in buying and selling, must have con-
tributed to these high market shares, as was the Company's explicit
intention.
71. See A & P Main Brief, App. A, Vol. I, 132, Appeals Case; Government
Exhibit 3025, quoted in Gov't Brief 766, District Court Case; Government Exhibit
2778, Gov't Brief 744, ibid. The explanation given on the stand, that directives to
"turn on the heat" or "hit them with meat and produce" merely meant to "feature
meats and produce in advertising," is not convincing. Transcript of Record 16, 525, ibid.
72. A & P Main Brief, App. A, Vol. I, 210, Appeals Case; Gov't Brief 791, District
Court Case. Similar to this tactic was the organization of buying brigades to buy up
competitors' specials, thus preventing rivals from utilizing specials as a drawing card.
Gov't Brief 756-757, ibid. Many A & P meat markets were operated at net losses for as
many as four successive years. Gov't Main Brief 380-381, Appeals Case. See also
A & P Main Brief, App. A, Vol. I, 132, ibid; Government Exhibits 2778 and 3025,
District Court Case.
73. Gov't Main Brief 386, Appeals Case.
74. Percentages derived from Facts in Food and Grocery Distribution as of
January, 1951, The Progressive Grocer, 1951, and previous issues.
75. Transcript of Record 16,098, District Court Case.
76. A & P Main Brief 59-60, Appeals Case. This was the only study of the kind
made and included only 189 out of 647 towns in the Central Division.
77. District Court Case, 67 F.Supp. at 633.
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In view of the evidence brought forward by the government, set
out at great length by Judge Lindley and summarized by Judge Minton,
it would be myopic to conclude that the A & P criminal and civil suits
represented an attack on promotional pricing or the good faith meeting
of competition. 78 When one looks at the government's case and the
two decisions as a whole, the essence of the crimes stands out as the
Company's intention to increase its business by the use of coercive bargain-
ing in buying and to eliminate competitors by discriminatory sharp-
shooting in selling. Thus the contention that the briefs and decisions in
the A & P case represent a threat to competitive pricing or to the effi-
ciency advantages of geographical integration is without substantial
foundation.
b. Impact of the Suggested Remedy
In order to prevent repetition of local price discrimination as well
as to dissipate the concentrated buying power of the chain, the Antitrust
Division has suggested that A & P's control of the seven retail divisions
be dissolved. In this fashion the possibility of widespread and long-
continued subsidization would be lessened, if not eliminated. 79 There
may be grounds for believing that disintegration into seven huge, geo-
graphically distinct divisions would not go far enough in reducing A & iP's
78. Admittedly, there are isolated phrases in the government's brief in the District
Court Case-a document of over 1,000 pages-that appear to advocate cost-plus pricing;
and similar inferences may be drawn from isolated statements in the decisions.
79. The Antitrust Division's position is not undermined by pointing out that, no
matter how small a chain may be, it is always possible for subsidization to take
place. Where the chain is nationwide, the presumption of unfairness is a heavy one to
overcome. If the chain operates, let us say, only in New England, not only is it less
likely to permit all the stores in the Boston area to run at a loss for a long period of
time, but when the management does lose money in isolated cases in an effort to meet
competition, there is little likelihood such conduct could reasonably be classified as
unfair competition. Fairness is partly a matter of current mores, partly determined by
the current market pattern, and partly a function of the size and power of the firm
using the tactics in question. That the giant doing thirty percent of the business of
all grocery chains had the power to compete unfairly cannot be ignored in assessing its
action and deciding how free it may be to compete as it sees fit.
In the A & P case the government was successful in excluding from the trial
evidence which might have proved that other retailers followed a policy of reducing
prices under similar circumstances. It argued that the other retailers could not "recoup
their losses in one area from the profits in another," nor could they "maintain such a
policy until control of a predetermined desired percentage of an available local market
had been obtained"--in short, that the same practice becomes more objectionable the
more powerful its perpetrator. Gov't Main Brief 453, Appeals Case. This is certainly
correct, both ethically and economically, merely mirroring Justice Cardozo's recognition
in the Swift case that size carries an unusual opportunity for abuse. United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932). Moreover, the government argued that use by
others of the same techniques, under the same circumstances, would also have con-
stituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.
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market power.80 Perhaps the distintegration should create competing
chains within the present divisional organizations.
This solution would probably not diminish price competition-par-
ticularly if the chain were split in such a way that those market areas with
several A & P supermarkets were assigned to more than one legatee of
the former controlling division .8 The present A & P management, in an
effort to prevent recurrence of the type of local discrimination that led
to the criminal case, now abstains from week-end price wars, 2 although
it continues in many areas by an "every-day" low price policy to set the
retail target for which its competitors shoot, day in and day out. In
most large cities the small chains and large independents are the most
vigorous price cutters. A & P's conduct after the trial seems to suggest
that a rearrangement of its structure, leaving it free to engage in vigorous
price competition without the power it once possessed, would leave it
a far more effective competitor than would an injunction or the threat
of future criminal suits.
Would the severance of A & P into smaller chains raise the cost of
grocery distribution? A precise answer to this question would necessitate
a comparison of A & P's costs today with those of competitors roughly
the size of First National Stores in New England or American Stores
in Pennsylvania and New York.8 While recent data for A & P are not
available, it is known that in 1943 what A & P calls the gross profit rate,
or the difference between cost of merchandise and gross sales, expressed
as a percentage of the latter, was 14.20 percent. (This margin of course
80. See Hirsch and Votaw, supra note 38, at 16.
81. None of the competitors of A & P interviewed by the writers believed that
splitting up A & P would dampen competition in the slightest degree. Some hazarded a
guess that it would intensify price competition because the independent divisions would
be relieved of the centralized control over gross profit rates.
It is possible that any separation of stores within present units now jointly using
the same warehouses might involve some inefficiency. However, the normal growth of
total business and the increasing tendency for individual supermarkets (including A &
P's), themselves growing larger and larger, to take direct shipment would tend to
minimize the resultant disruption.
82. Analyses of price wars and price competition, from the point of view of
independent stores and supermarkets, can be found in SUPERMtARKET INSTITUTE, 13TH
ANNUAL CONVENTION 43-45 (May, 1950); SUPERMARKET INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS 36
(Midyear, 1949); SUPERMARKET INSTITUTE, 11TH ANNUAL CONVENTION 48-49 (1948);
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Select Committee on Sinall Business,
on Monopolistic and Unfair Trade Practices, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-129, 342-363,
626-642, 708, 725, 776-790 (1948). See also SAFEWAY STORES, PoLIciEs 43 (1947) ("Meet
the lowest price of every competitor, item by item, day by day, and town by town.").
However, cf. Cassady and Grether, Locality Price Differentials in the Western Retail
Grocery Trade, 21 HARV. Bus. REv. 190 (1943).
83. The Boston Star Markets can buy carload lots or part of a shipload of canned
goods and distribute directly to its 7 or 8 stores; a chain with hundreds of retail stores,
however, must incur the costs of breakdown, storage and assembly.
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has to cover the chain's wholesaling as well as retailing costs.)8 4 This
compares with a later estimate for all chain supermarkets of 15 percent.8 5
First National's margin was under 14 percent of sales in each of the years
1947 through 1951, while American Stores' margin ranged from 14.7
to 16.4.8G It might be assumed that the total margin for independents,
including an allowance for wholesaling, would be significantly higher
than the foregoing since the average retail margin is 17 percent and the
wholesale 8 to 9 percent; but this is not necessarily the case. In the first
place, the larger stores can do business with lower margins because of
the opportunities for reducing labor expense. There are owners of
supermarkets and chains of supermarkets claiming expense ratios as low
as 13 or even 11 percent. 87 Efficient independent supermarkets with
annual sales of over $500,000 were doing business with a gross margin
of 15 percent in 1950.88 The wholesaler's margin cannot be added in its
entirety to this 15 percent because these stores buy a large part of their
groceries and produce directly from the manufacturer or grower in car-
load lots.
Although no recent comprehensive survey of food chain profits is
available, an OPA survey indicated that chains doing a tenth or less of
A & P's volume of business had higher returns on net worth than chains
in any other size groups.8s Computations from financial statements in
Moody's show that in recent years A & P has earned a lower return on
net worth than the small chains like Food Fair, Winn & Lovett, Loblaw's,
Albers Supermarkets, Dixie Stores, and has run neck and neck with
First National Stores.
In order to achieve maximum efficiency at the wholesale level, it is
not necessary to be a member of a national chain doing annually $3 billion
of business. The prospective performance of the proposed retail chains
to be carved out of A & P may be gauged by the record of wholesalers
for the voluntary chains (like IGA, Red and White and Clover Farms)
and cooperative wholesalers (like the National Association of Retail-
Owned Grocers). According to one well-grounded estimate, expense
84. See A & P Main Brief, Headquarters Chart II, facing p. 58, and Government
Exhibit 3670, facing p. 188, Appeals Case. A & P does not publish its cost of sales or
sales volume so that for subsequent years there are no comparable data.
85. SHiELDs, EVOLUTION OF MODEmN FOOD DIsTmunTION (15th Annual Meeting,
National Association of Food Chains, 1948).
86. Computed from Moody's. The retail sales volume of these chains is approxi-
mately equal to what each of the proposed successors to A & P will enjoy.
87. SUPER=ARK INSTITUTE, PRooCaINGS 128 (1948).
88. Facts in Food and Grocery Distribution as of January, 1951, The Progressive
Grocer, 1951, p. 16.
89. SURVEY OF RETAIL CHAIN GRocERY STORES AND WHOLESALE GROCERS (OPA
Economic Data Series No. 26, 1947).
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ratios of wholesaling processed groceries have been cut on the average
by 50 percent since 1929.90 Several voluntary group wholesalers inter-
viewed by the authors were operating on a margin of 4 percent or less.91
And, as Professor Converse points out, well managed, retailer-owned (or
cooperative) wholesalers operate at slightly lower expense rates than
chain warehouses.9 2
Moreover, thaiiks to the Robinson-Patman Act, these wholesalers
can, through their national organizations, purchase most dry groceries,
canned foods, meats, and high profit items like drugs, nylons, and other
household articles as cheaply as the corporate chains. They have their
own labels for many items of standardized quality; they prepare adver-
tising, posters, and sales campaigns, including selection of specials for
weekly promotion; and in general they function in much the same fashion
as an A & P or other chain parent warehouse. Voluntary and cooperative
wholesalers long ago eliminated salesmen, so laid out their warehouses
that the selection line conforms to the order in which items are listed in
the order, installed punch-card billing and inventory equipment, palletized
the selection and reserve storage areas, and installed conveyor systems.
There is every reason to believe that well-managed wholesale members of
national organizations, such as IGA, Red & White, Clover Farms, and
NAROG, as well as outstanding unaffiliated voluntary wholesalers like
Winston and Newell, have invoice and operating costs matching those
of chain warehouses. 93
90. Converse, Marketing Costs Have Not Increased in 40 Years, Printers Ink,
Aug. 3, 1951, p. 29.
91. A cooperative in Los Angeles works on a 2.5 percent margin. CAssADY AND
JONES, THE CHANGING COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE IN THE WHOLESALE GROCERY TRADE 37
(1949). Some Red and White wholesalers are doing business on a 4 percent mark-up.
Communication from H. T. Webb, Feb. 6, 1951.
92. Converse, supra note 90.
93. For operating and merchandising techniques of voluntary and cooperative
wholesalers and their national organizations see the following: Tousley, Reducing
Distribution Costs in the Grocery Field, A Case Study, 12 J. MARKETING 455 (1948);
Cole, General Discussion of Vertical Integration, in WEDDING, ed., VERTICAL INTEGRA-
TION IN MARKETING 69-70 (University of Illinois Bureau of Economic and Business
Research, Bulletin No. 74, 1952) ; GORE, THE NEW CONcEPT IN WHOLESA.ER-RETAILER
TEAMWORK (General Foods Sales Division, 1951); MESSEROLE AND SEVIN, EFFECTIVE
GROCERY WHOLESALING (U. S. Department of Commerce, Economic Series No. 14,
1941), passhn; Zimmerman, Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperatives System for Handling
Customers' Orders, reprint from The Voluntary and Cooperative Groups Magazine, July,
1949; THE IGAUTOMATIC PLAN FOR WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION (1949); 29th Anni-
versary Issue, Red & White News, May, 1950; FORWARD WITH CLOVER FARM STORES
(Clover Farms Organization, no date) ; How TO STEP FORWARD THROUGH YouR Asso-
ciation with WINSTON AND NEWE= Co., (2d ed. 1950). See also Grocer's Bid in
Wholesaling, Business Week, Nov. 11, 1950, pp. 66-68 for a description of minimum
cost operation of Certified Grocers, Ltd. There are approximately 3,000 retail members
of the Clover Farm plan. Communication from R. E. George, Jan. 19, 1951. IGA
members total about 10,000 and have an estimated sales volume of $1,500,000,000. Corn-
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It is not likely that the projected plan would retard innovation in
the field of grocery distribution. The chains were not responsible for
the conception and introduction of the most important technological
innovation of recent years: The self-service supermarket. The super-
market was a creation of independent wholesalers and far-seeing indi-
vidual entrepreneurs.9 4 The A & P management did not react to the
threat of supermarkets until some three years after they had become a
disturbing element. 95 Also, it is not clear that the introduction and
development of frozen foods or pre-packaging of meats are innovations
attributable to giant chains.
There is a possibility that severance of the control of the present
A & P owners might lead, through a distribution of the stock, to greater
pressure for dividends and earnings, which would result in increasing
the Company's gross profit rate and raising prices. The present manage-
ment is concerned with maximizing not profits but total volume of
business. Because of high personal income tax rates, there is no incentive
to increase the $7 dividend on shares of common stock presently out-
standing. 6 It is questionable whether this contingency should deter the
Antitrust Division from pressing for a dissolution if it seems otherwise
warranted.
IV
CONCLUSION
The government's disintegration program for A & P has presented
legal and economic problems of some consequence. To some degree the
suits have represented a deviation from previous antitrust law. True,
A & P enjoyed various kinds of substantial economic power-the power
to coerce suppliers into preferences, the power to apply heavy leverage in
individual retail markets. True, also, in many individual markets it
enjoyed so large a market share that it must have enjoyed some monopoly
power-a power limited by relative freedom of entry but enhanced by
the manifest dangers of entry into competition with so powerful an
munication from Helen Clark, Jan. 18, 1951. Red & White stores number about 8,500
and do about $1,000,000,000 of business. Red & White News, May, 1950. The National
Retail Owned Grocers Cooperative organization is probably larger than any of the
other voluntary groups but provides no information in published form. It comprises in
all about 100 wholesalers, operating some 120 warehouses with 3 regional buying offices.
94. The origins of the supermarkets are discussed in Zimmerman, The Supermarket,
Printers Ink, July 9, 1936, p. 10; July 16, 1936, p. 53. See also Larabee, Grocery Maim-
facturers Condemn Supernurket Price-Cutters, Printers Ink, March 2, 1933, and Landau,
Is the Price-Wrecking Market Here to Stay?, Chain Store Age, Grocery Edition, March,
1933, p. 74.
95. A & P Main Brief, App. A, Vol. I, 194-197, Appeals Case.
96. A & P Main Brief 22, ibid.
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antagonist. Finally, it may also be true that the Company sought
monopoly power, in a sense, when it set targets for market shares large
enough to give it some influence over those markets and set margins
low enough to assure those shares. On the other hand, A & P's monopoly
power, in the relatively narrow economic conception, was very limited.
Probably never before had a firm with that little monopoly power, of
that kind, been convicted of violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act.9 '
Probably never before were competitive tactics, so many of which may
be regarded as having been truly and unexceptionably competitive, so
questionably lumped together as evincing an intention to monopolize.
Nevertheless, the foregoing survey has also indicated the reasonable-
ness of the rationale of the criminal decisions: There was clear evidence
of an unfair exertion of market leverage; there were clear instances of
use of predatory tactics. The question now is whether the criminal
conviction will be sufficient to clear the air and prevent recurrence of
the undesirable practices and yet leave A & P substantially free to com-
pete vigorously in the public interest. It scarcely seems fair to the
Company to direct it to continue competing as vigorously as possible,
while keeping it under the threat of prosecution if it again oversteps
the (necessarily indistinct) mark. Both pricing and bargaining tactics
of the chain have apparently been under wraps since the first conviction;
this is not necessarily in the public interest. It is difficult to see how
all these operations, involving a nationwide chain doing billions of
dollars worth of business a year and hiring thousands of employees,
could be adequately policed by injunctions-which would be an alterna-
tive to the disintegration proposed in the civil suit-without hamstringing
the Company excessively; it is likewise difficult to believe that a mere
criminal conviction will serve as an adequate deterrent. Why not remove
the condition which makes the delinquency possible-that is, the excessive
size of the chain?
Does the government proposal run counter to good economics?
There is nothing to show that the community will lose by unscrambob-
bling, as Pogo would say, this immense omelette.9 Vertical integration
could still be practiced on a somewhat reduced, but nonetheless efficient,
97. This point is elaborated in Note, Trouble Begin.s in the "'New" Shernian Act:
The Perplexing Story of the A & P Case, 58 YALE L.J. 969 (1949).
98. A reading of minutes of the meetings of the Divisional Presidents leaves the
impression that John Hartford was wholeheartedly devoted to increasing the volume of
business by keeping prices and costs consistently and permanently low. See A & P
Main Brief, App. A, Vol. I, 136-137, 149, 170, 197, 210-211, Appeals Case.
99. Note the parallel conclusion in Dirlam and Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the
Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L. J. 818, 858 (1952), that competition might be assisted
by setting up a greater number of integrated marketers of reduced size.
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scale by the large successors to the present A & P. They might coopera-
tively continue to maintain their essentially unexceptionable manufactur-
ing organization. The success of many smaller chains shows that the
economies of horizontal integration become negligible well before the
point reached by the A & P.100 Hence, little would be lost by severance
of economic relations between the divisions.101
Dissolution is not intended to be a form of punishment. In fact,
apart from the capital gains taxes which do impose a punitive burden
on owners forced to divest, it is not necessarily injurious to the defend-
ants. Dissolution was probably the best thing that could have happened
to the Standard Oil Company in 1911, and U. S. Steel would probably
have been far better off had it not escaped that fate in 1920.102 The fact
remains that the courts, the public, and most antitrust defenders all feel
that dissolution is an extreme sort of treatment. The question remains
therefore whether A & P in fact had sufficiently great power, and
demonstrated a sufficiently consistent tendency to abuse what power it
had, to justify breaking it up rather than relying on an injunction. Much
of what has been said would indicate that the power and the extent of its
use may easily be exaggerated.10 3 This is the ultimate policy question
which can be decided only by the courts.
This article has in general concluded that if A & P is eventually
broken up it will not be because the antitrust laws condemn integration
as such, but because, as Justice Cardozo put it, 04 they frown on size
and power which carry an opportunity for abuse, particularly when the
power has been so exerted. The "workability" of competition does not
depend solely on the efficiency with which competitors perform. It also
requires a balance of power between them, and between sellers and
buyers. Where the balance has apparently been upset, the law cannot
ignore the unbalance and may well move to correct it. In addition, the
conclusion seems inescapable that a decree of dissolution in the interest
of making this correction would probably result in more, not less,
effective competition in grocery retailing.
100. This argument is made convincingly by Hirsch and Votaw, supra note
38, at 2-4.
101. A relevant parallel is provided by the disintegration of the holding company
empires. Cries of alarm turned out to be premature, to say the least. The final judgment
of the financial community is that disintegration has made for greater not less
efficiency. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (Report of the S.E.C. to
the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, U. S. Sen.)
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-23 (1952).
102. Kaplan and Kahn, Big Business in a Competitive Society, Fortune, February,
1953, Sec. 2, p. 12.
103. See supra notes 28, 37, 41, 51, 70 and pp. 5, 14-15, 19-20.
104. In the Swift case, supr note 79.
